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Abstract
Conformist social learning can have a pronounced impact on the cultural evolution of human
societies, and it can shape both the genetic and cultural evolution of human social behavior
more broadly. Conformist social learning is beneficial when the social learner and the dem-
onstrators from whom she learns are similar in the sense that the same behavior is optimal
for both. Otherwise, the social learner’s optimum is likely to be rare among demonstrators,
and conformity is costly. The trade-off between these two situations has figured prominently
in the longstanding debate about the evolution of conformity, but the importance of the
trade-off can depend critically on the flexibility of one’s social learning strategy. We devel-
oped a gene-culture coevolutionary model that allows cognition to encode and process infor-
mation about the similarity between naive learners and experienced demonstrators.
Facultative social learning strategies that condition on perceived similarity evolve under cer-
tain circumstances. When this happens, facultative adjustments are often asymmetric.
Asymmetric adjustments mean that the tendency to follow the majority when learners per-
ceive demonstrators as similar is stronger than the tendency to follow the minority when
learners perceive demonstrators as different. In an associated incentivized experiment, we
found that social learners adjusted how they used social information based on perceived
similarity, but adjustments were symmetric. The symmetry of adjustments completely elimi-
nated the commonly assumed trade-off between cases in which learners and demonstrators
share an optimum versus cases in which they do not. In a second experiment that maxi-
mized the potential for social learners to follow their preferred strategies, a few social
learners exhibited an inclination to follow the majority. Most, however, did not respond sys-
tematically to social information. Additionally, in the complete absence of information about
their similarity to demonstrators, social learners were unwilling to make assumptions about
whether they shared an optimum with demonstrators. Instead, social learners simply
ignored social information even though this was the only information available. Our results
suggest that social cognition equips people to use conformity in a discriminating fashion that
moderates the evolutionary trade-offs that would occur if conformist social learning was rig-
idly applied.
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Introduction
If people learn from others who vary, and if this learning process is not completely random,
cultural evolution must occur in many situations. By extension, the psychology of social influ-
ence and social learning is almost certain to generate cultural evolutionary dynamics of one
sort or another [1, 2]. Cultural evolution, in turn, can influence natural selection on genes,
including genes that influence cognitive processes related to social influence and social learn-
ing. This is the basic logic of gene-culture coevolutionary theory, and it has been extremely
influential in the evolutionary study of human behavior. It ties together, in an evolutionary
process involving two linked systems of inheritance, the biological evolution of social cogni-
tion and the social cognition that underpins cultural evolution. People transmit and inherit
both genetic and cultural information. Genes affect culture, and culture affects genes.
Conformist cultural transmission represents an especially prominent hypothesis. Confor-
mity has a long history in the social sciences [3–8], and conformist cultural transmission is
part of this tradition [9]. Conformist transmission centers around the hypothesis that the psy-
chology of social learning generates a disproportionate tendency to follow the majority [1, 10,
11]. For example, if 75% of the people in a reference group exhibit a certain behavior, a con-
formist adopts this same behavior with a probability greater than 0.75. Such a tendency has the
interesting property that it can stabilize differences between cultural groups [12–14] even in
the face of persistent contact between the groups in question. Genes cannot do this, and for
this reason conformity has figured repeatedly in the protracted, on-going, and acrimonious
debate about the special role of culture in shaping the evolution of human cooperation [1, 2,
15–25].
Existing theory on the evolution of conformity typically assumes that frequency-dependent
social learning strategies are fixed at the individual level [26, 27]. For example, if an agent has
an inherited social learning strategy that dictates adopting the most common behavior in the
social group, this response to frequency information does not vary for that agent. Conditional
on social learning occurring, this assumption maximizes evolutionary trade-offs because the
agent cannot adjust her use of social information according to circumstance, and for this rea-
son the assumed rigidity of the social learning strategy is not simply an innocuous simplifica-
tion for modelers. It is also not consistent with recent empirical evidence showing that the use
of social information varies both across individuals and from one situation to another [27, 28].
We focus on how learners vary their response to social information from one situation to
another because this kind of variation can radically affect evolutionary costs and benefits.
Using both an evolutionary model and associated experiments, we specifically consider if and
when social cognition supports a flexible response to information about the relative frequen-
cies of different behaviors. To facilitate our discussion, we distinguish between two types of
individual. Demonstrators have completed a learning process of some sort and made observ-
able choices based on what they have learned. Learners, in contrast, are in the middle of their
learning process. They are processing the information that will lead them to choose an observ-
able behavior, but they have not yet made a choice. In particular, each learner observes the dis-
tribution of behaviors in a sample of demonstrators, and this social information somehow
affects her own choice. In this sense, learners learn socially, and facultative adjustments to how
learners do so will be our primary concern.
The adaptive value of conformist cultural transmission [1] involves two key considerations,
namely the extent to which demonstrators choose their own optimum and the similarity
between demonstrators and learners. Although demonstrators may not make optimal choices
for various reasons [29, 30], demonstrators should exhibit some bias toward their own opti-
mum if learning in the recent past has worked at all. If such a bias exists, the similarity between
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demonstrators and learners is decisive. Specifically, existing theory suggests that the evolution
of conformity hinges critically on the rate at which learners and demonstrators are similar in
that the same behavior is optimal for both [1, 26, 30–34].
Adopting the most common behavior among demonstrators will usually be beneficial for
learners when demonstrators and learners have the same optimum, but detrimental when
optima differ. Spatial and temporal heterogeneity [1, 31–36], specialized roles in society [33,
37, 38], recent technological innovations [29, 39, 40], and transmission errors [28, 33] can all
affect the probability that a learner learns from demonstrators who themselves learned under
similar circumstances. The details matter. For example, temporal heterogeneity should expose
learners to demonstrators with a different optimum if cultural transmission is across genera-
tions, but not if transmission is within generations. Analogously, spatial heterogeneity should
expose learners to demonstrators with a different optimum if demonstrators learned in one
location, only to move around and demonstrate their learned behaviors in other locations.
However, if the sequence is move, then learn and demonstrate, any discrepancy in optima
between learners and demonstrators should be less pronounced.
The common theme here is that some set of mechanisms produces a probabilistic relation-
ship between demonstrator optima and learner optima. Whatever the underlying mechanisms,
this relationship affects the costs and benefits of different social learning strategies. If a con-
formist bias evolves under positive covariance in optima, for example, and if the bias is indis-
criminately applied by social learners, it will bring a benefit when learners and demonstrators
are similar and a cost when different. Natural selection must sort out the relative importance
of these costs and benefits, and theory about the evolution of conformist transmission gener-
ally takes this form [26, 27, 33, 34]. The calculus changes, however, if learners can adjust how
they use social information according to circumstance.
We developed and analyzed a gene-culture coevolutionary model (S1 Appendix) in which
learners, apart from processing information about the distribution of behaviors among dem-
onstrators, can also process information about their similarity to demonstrators. In practice,
we suspect that information about similarity can take many forms. In some cases, the informa-
tion may directly address the relevant question of whether learners and demonstrators share
an optimum. Charles admires LeBron James, but even a cursory comparison directly reveals
that in many domains Charles’ optimal choices are not the same as Mr. James. In other cases,
information about similarity could be something like a shared ethnic marker [41] that corre-
lates positively with learners and demonstrators having the same optimum.
Whatever form information about similarity might take, we show that under the right con-
ditions social cognition evolves to support facultative social learning strategies that condition
on perceived similarity. For this to happen, learners must be exposed to demonstrators with
different optima at a sufficiently high rate, and they must have sufficiently reliable information
about similarity. Interestingly, when facultative social learning strategies evolve, adjustments
often evolve to be asymmetric. This means the response to social information is most extreme
when a learner has information indicating she is similar to demonstrators. The response is less
extreme when available information indicates dissimilarity.
We examined these ideas with an experiment. We tested for both facultative social learning
strategies and, if facultative, asymmetries in the adjustments participants make. We then fol-
lowed up with a second experiment. This second experiment allowed us to see if social learners
reveal preferences for specific forms of social learning, and if they reveal assumptions that
reflect an evolutionary history in which demonstrators and learners usually shared an opti-
mum. In particular, if social cognition evolved under conditions in which social learners were
typically similar to those from whom they learned, and if cognition does not fully adjust to
departures from these typical conditions in the past, then social learners should have some
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preference for following the majority and some tendency to assume similarity. Our second
experiment tested these ideas by maximizing the potential for social learners to reveal both
their preferred social learning strategies and any assumptions they might make about their
similarity to demonstrators. Put differently, we asked if a preference for conformity and an
assumption of similarity might be part of a core system of social knowledge [42]. Our empiri-
cal strategy for this question was to remove all incentives and sources of information that
might conflict with such a core system and observe what remained.
The evolved social cognition of perceived similarity
Consider a setting with two environmental states and two behaviors. Behavior 0 is optimal in
state 0. Behavior 1 is optimal in state 1. We examine the evolution of cognition and an associ-
ated learning system in this setting (see S1 Appendix for details). Demonstrators have com-
pleted their learning process and chosen either 0 or 1. This choice is observable to others.
Learners, in contrast, are in the middle of their learning process. They are processing the infor-
mation that will lead them to choose an observable behavior, but they have not yet made a
choice. Learners do not know which state they face, but they enjoy high payoffs if they choose
optimally. This provides the basis for the evolution of cognition. Given time, natural selection
identifies the cognitive systems best at leading learners to choose optimally and receive high
payoffs as a result.
A cognitive system that ignores similarity
Before choosing, each learner receives two types of information. In no particular order, each
learner receives a private signal, s 2 R. This signal provides noisy information about the state
the learner faces. Each learner also samples N demonstrators and observes that i of them
exhibit behavior 1. In effect, by observing s the learner learns individually because she consid-
ers her own private information about the environmental state. By observing i the learner
learns socially because she considers the choices of others. The state among demonstrators is y,
and the state among learners is z. Demonstrators and learners face a different state and thus
have different optima with probability γ. They face the same state and have the same optimum
with probability 1 − γ. We will routinely refer to the former situation as “discordant” and the
latter as “concordant.” Ex ante, the covariance between learner and demonstrator optima is
(1 − 2γ)/4. To summarize the learner’s problem intuitively, the learner has some private infor-
mation (s), she has some social information (i), and she needs to make a choice consistent with
her environment (z).
Perreault and colleagues [34] developed an innovative approach to modeling the evolution
of a learning system in this setting. They did not simply posit a set of learning strategies
according to what seems reasonable to the modeler and then let selection sort out the best
strategies. Rather, they assumed that learners need to solve an inferential problem based on the
Bayesian posterior, P(z|i, s). The posterior is used by the modeler to identify the information a
decision maker would need to draw a Bayesian inference. The learners under consideration,
however, do not actually make Bayesian calculations. Rather, they have cognitive representa-
tions of the information required for an inference. These cognitive representations are inher-
ited genetically, they can vary across learners, and they summarize the stochastic properties of
the decision-making task in a more or less accurate way. For a given learner, the cognitive
representation is fixed, and it consists of two quantities. The first quantity summarizes how
reliably s identifies the learner’s environment, and hence it is a representation of how effective
individual learning is. We use the symbol a^ for this quantity (S1 Appendix). The second quan-
tity summarizes how effectively demonstrators choose their own optimum, regardless of
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whether learners and demonstrators have the same optimum. We use q^ for this quantity (S1
Appendix). In the model of Perreault and colleagues [34], these two quantities enter the model
as a single unit-free combination, and this combination is the one-dimensional trait under
selection.
In particular, given an inherited value for this trait, a learner observes i and s and then
chooses a behavior by following a simple rule that would maximize expected payoffs under a
Bayesian posterior. The learner, however, does not necessarily maximize expected payoffs
because her cognitive representation of the decision-making task does not necessarily produce
the same posterior as an actual Bayesian.
Evolution proceeds as follows [34]. Genetically inherited cognitive representations affect
how learners choose between the two possible behaviors. Learning can lead the distribution of
behaviors in a population to change through time in a cultural evolutionary process. As the
distribution of behaviors changes, the relative values of different cognitive representations can
also change. Natural selection responds accordingly in a genetic evolutionary process. The dis-
tribution of behaviors and the distribution of cognitive representations evolve together in a
gene-culture coevolutionary system. A learning system that integrates private and social infor-
mation emerges endogenously and eventually stabilizes.
The steady-state learning system has two crucial features [34]. First, it optimizes the trade-
off between the accuracy of individual learning and the economy of social learning [43, 44].
Second, learners exhibit positive social influence. Positive social influence means that, as the
observed frequency of a behavior increases among demonstrators, the probability that a
learner chooses the same behavior also increases. Negative social influence means the opposite;
learner choices are negatively related to demonstrator choices. Crucially, not all forms of posi-
tive social influence are equivalent in terms of the cultural evolutionary dynamics they produce
[11]. A learning system based on P(z|i, s), however, often evolves to show the characteristic “S”
shape of conformist cultural transmission [34]. Because equilibrium strategies optimize the
trade-off between private and social information, individual learning can reduce the expected
costs of conformity when the learner optimum is at low frequency among demonstrators. The
extent to which this holds, however, depends on the reliability of private information (see [34]
and S1 Appendix).
In any case, because the evolution of cognition is based on P(z|i, s), which only considers
the learner’s state, cognition does not allow learners to process information about the similar-
ity between themselves and the demonstrators from whom they learn. This imposes the stron-
gest possible evolutionary trade-off between discordant and concordant instances.
Conformity, or positive social influence more broadly, is costly in the former case and advanta-
geous in the latter. If learners, however, had some idea about whether they share an optimum
with demonstrators, learners could potentially retain the upside of conformity and attenuate
the downside. In particular, they could do so more than what is possible by simply relying on
individual learning to limit the occasional damage caused by conformity.
A cognitive system that considers similarity
To examine how evolution might attenuate the trade-off between discordant and concordant
instances, we developed a model (S1 Appendix) that allows cognition to process information
about the similarity between demonstrators and learners. In addition to i and s, each learner
observes a noisy private signal, a, that indicates whether she and the demonstrators she learns
from have the same optimum. As mentioned earlier, this signal may pertain directly to the
question of whether a learner and her demonstrators have the same optimum. However, it
might also be some other, potentially correlated variable like sex, ethnicity, or dialect. Whatever
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PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0168551 December 21, 2016 5 / 28
the underlying mechanism, the signal of similarity is correct with probability ϕ 0.5. Per-
ceived similarity modulates how the learner responds to social information. Because we allow
cognition to evaluate similarity, we consider the evolution of an inferential system based on the
Bayesian posterior P(y, z|a, i, s). In other words, learners do not simply consider the state they
face (z); they also consider the state demonstrators faced when demonstrators were themselves
learners (y).
Learners do not actually perform Bayesian calculations. Rather, we use the Bayesian poste-
rior to identify the structure of the cognitive system that evolves under natural selection. In
particular, the model outlined earlier [34] involves a single cognitive representation that is a
unit-free combination of a^ and q^. Aside from a^ and q^, our model requires two additional
quantities (S1 Appendix). The quantity g^ is the cognitive representation of the probability that
learners and demonstrators have different optima. It is, in effect, an inherited Bayesian prior
pertaining to similarity. The quantity ^ is the cognitive representation of the ex ante probabil-
ity that the signal of similarity (a) is correct. This inherited representation affects how the
learner responds to a realized signal of similarity. Importantly, γ and ϕ capture the actual struc-
ture of the decision-making task; they do not change. In contrast, g^ and ^ are genetically
inherited cognitive representations of these same quantities. They may be accurate for one
individual, but they can also be wildly inaccurate for another. g^ and ^ do not change at the
individual level, but the distribution of g^ and ^ values in the population changes through time
as the evolutionary process unfolds.
We show (S1 Appendix) that a gene-culture coevolutionary system based on P(y, z|a, i, s)
gives rise to learning strategies that are sometimes, though not always, facultative. If a strategy
is facultative, the learner conditions how she learns on her perceived similarity to demonstra-
tors (i.e. a). To motivate our experiments, we now focus on three key findings from the model.
These findings hold for cases in which individual learning is relatively difficult. We focus on
these cases because, when individual learning is difficult, evolution leads to learning systems
that emphasize social learning. An emphasis on social learning, in turn, ensures scope for the
evolution of a cognitive system that responds to perceived similarity by changing how learners
learn from demonstrators. As explained later, we examined an extreme version of this scenario
in our experiments by forcing a subset of participants to learn exclusively via social learning.
When individual learning is relatively difficult, which is equivalent to saying that s is a rela-
tively noisy indicator of the learner’s state, three key findings follow.
1. If the signal of similarity is uninformative (ϕ = 0.5), the evolved learning system is not facul-
tative, and it typically exhibits positive social influence (Fig 1). These results are intuitive.
Without a meaningful indicator of similarity, cognition does not evolve to condition learn-
ing on perceived similarity. Positive social influence evolves because we typically assume
learner optima covary positively, though to varying degrees, with demonstrator optima.
Natural selection simply responds to the standard trade-off between discordant and con-
cordant cases. Because concordance is common, positive social influence evolves as it
would without a signal of similarity.
2. Facultative learning evolves if learners benefit from discriminating based on similarity
(γ> 0), and they have information that allows them to do so (ϕ> 0.5). The joint effect of
these two mechanisms is critical. For example, if learners and demonstrators almost always
have the same optimum (e.g. 1 − γ = 0.99), the evolved learning system may not be mean-
ingfully facultative (Fig 2) even if the signal of similarity is quite reliable (e.g. ϕ = 0.9). How-
ever, holding signal reliability constant, the need to discriminate based on similarity
increases as the positive covariance in optima declines (e.g. 1 − γ = 0.9), and the learning
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system that evolves is facultative (S1 Appendix). Moreover, if discriminating is sufficiently
important and the signal of similarity is sufficiently reliable, the learning system can evolve
to be strongly facultative (Fig 2). By strongly facultative we mean that learners follow the
minority choice among demonstrators if the signal of similarity indicates different optima,
and they follow the majority choice if the signal indicates the same optimum. The former is
a form of negative social influence and the latter a form of positive social influence. In other
cases (e.g. 1 − γ = 0.9 and ϕ = 0.7), learning can evolve to be facultative but simply exhibit
varying degrees of positive social influence.
Fig 1. Evolved learning strategies when individual learning is relatively unreliable and the signal of similarity is uninformative.
Solid lines summarize the properties of the learning system by showing the probability that learners choose their own optimum as a function
of how common this same behavior is among demonstrators. Learning strategies potentially depend on whether a learner receives a signal
of similarity indicating either different optima (Discordant signal, A and C) for learners and demonstrators or the same optimum (Concordant
signal, B and D). This signal of similarity is uninformative (ϕ = 0.5, cf. Fig 2). Rows vary according to whether a difference in optima is rare (A
and B, γ = 0.01) or more common (C and D, γ = 0.1). The horizontal dashed lines show a learning system that ignores demonstrator
behavior and relies only on individual learning. The diagonal dashed lines show an unbiased learning system that does not generate cultural
evolution. See S1 Appendix for model details.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0168551.g001
Evolution of Facultative Conformity
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3. Facultative adjustments are often asymmetric. As explained in the previous point, evolution
can produce learners who switch, based on perceived similarity, between following a
minority of demonstrators and a majority of demonstrators. Facultative switching of this
sort is often asymmetric. This means the tendency to follow the minority when the signal of
similarity indicates different optima is weaker than the tendency to follow the majority
when the signal indicates the same optimum (Fig 2). Asymmetric learning systems tend to
evolve when a shared optimum is typical. A Bayesian analysis clarifies why this is important
(S2 Appendix). If a shared optimum is typical (γ< 0.5), we can view 1 − γ> 0.5 as a prior
Fig 2. Evolved learning strategies when individual learning is relatively unreliable and the signal of similarity is informative. Solid
lines summarize the properties of the learning system by showing the probability that learners choose their own optimum as a function of
how common this same behavior is among demonstrators. Learning strategies potentially depend on whether a learner receives a signal of
similarity indicating either different optima (Discordant signal, A and C) for learners and demonstrators or the same optimum (Concordant
signal, B and D). This signal of similarity is informative (ϕ = 0.9, cf. Fig 1). Rows vary according to whether a difference in optima is rare (A
and B, γ = 0.01) or more common (C and D, γ = 0.1). The horizontal dashed lines show a learning system that ignores demonstrator
behavior and relies only on individual learning. The diagonal dashed lines show an unbiased learning system that does not generate cultural
evolution. See S1 Appendix for model details.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0168551.g002
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biased in favor of a shared optimum. An informative signal of similarity (ϕ> 0.5) that takes
a realized value indicating a shared optimum reinforces this biased prior and leads to an
even more strongly biased posterior. In contrast, a realized signal indicating different
optima must first offset the biased prior before it can support a biased posterior favoring a
belief in different optima. This is the difference between a signal indicating similarity and a
signal indicating dissimilarity. One can reduce the asymmetry, but this requires the covari-
ance in optima to approach zero or signals of similarity to approach perfect reliability
(S2 Appendix). Otherwise, Bayesian posteriors are inevitably asymmetric. Results from our
evolutionary model (S1 Appendix) show analogous patterns. For example, a moderately
informative signal (ϕ = 0.7) leads to the evolution of symmetric adjustments (S2 Appendix)
when learner optima do not covary with demonstrator optima (1 − γ = 0.5). Under positive
covariance (e.g. 1 − γ = 0.75), however, the evolved learning system produces highly asym-
metric adjustments under the same signal reliability (S2 Appendix). One can reduce the
asymmetry, but this requires an increasingly reliable signal of similarity (e.g. ϕ = 0.9,
S2 Appendix).
We conducted an experimental study to examine these ideas. Overall, we varied both the
similarity between demonstrators and learners and the information learners had about similar-
ity. The objective was to understand the flexibility of social learning strategies and how the
degree of flexibility affects payoffs. For example, if frequency-dependent social learning only
responds to changes in the distribution of choices among demonstrators, none of our experi-
mental manipulations should have mattered. If our manipulations did matter, however, this
would generically indicate that social learning can also depend on perceived similarity. Our
model would further suggest the following in this case. If social cognition evolved under posi-
tive covariance in optima and signals of similarity that were not excessively reliable, and if con-
temporary social cognition reflects these past regularities, we expect asymmetric facultative
adjustments. Otherwise, either a shared optimum was not typical in the past, signals of similar-
ity were exceedingly reliable, or contemporary social cognition is subtle enough to make
adjustments beyond those accounted for in our model.
Experiment 1
We divided participants into demonstrators, who learned individually, and social learners,
who could only learn by observing demonstrators. We use the term “social learner” here to
refer simply to a participant’s role in the experiment. We do not mean to imply that social
learners necessarily used the social information available to them. We implemented both dis-
cordant and concordant scenarios, and we provided social learners with information to infer
which of the two scenarios they were facing. Existing theory on the evolution of conformity
assumes social learning strategies that do not discriminate based on this kind of information.
If this assumption is generally valid, we should find that the social learners in our experiment
did not discriminate. If they did discriminate, social learning was facultative. We have shown
that in theory facultative strategies often evolve to be asymmetric. As we explain below, asym-
metric adjustments in our experiment would have necessarily reduced social learner payoffs in
either discordant or concordant situations, and we exploited this fact to test for asymmetries.
Materials and methods
For each decision-making trial, a participant had to choose between two urns, one on the “left”
and the other on the “right.” The urns contained red and blue balls, and participants received
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payments for balls of one color but not the other. Specifically, one urn contained one blue ball
and three red balls, while the other contained one red ball and three blue balls. After choosing
an urn, a ball would be randomly drawn from the chosen urn and then replaced. If the ball was
the winning color, the participant would receive 100 points. If the ball was the other color, the
participant would receive zero points. Each subject received points based only on her own
choices. Points were later converted to cash as payments made privately at the end of a session.
Like the model explained above, each participant had to choose between two options. One
option was optimal because it had more balls of the winning color. The other option was sub-
optimal.
At the beginning of a session, we divided all participants into two groups. The participants
in these two groups did not interact in any way during the session. Within a group, we ran-
domly assigned five participants to be demonstrators and from four to seven participants to be
social learners. Demonstrators only had private information about the consequences of their
own choices, while social learners only had public information about the choices of demon-
strators. We separated individual and social learning in this way for two reasons. First, our
focus is on the facultative use of social information. If participants in an experiment learn via
both private and social information, learning can potentially be facultative with respect to both
types of information. This would complicate the task of identifying how social learning in par-
ticular changes, and we eliminated this possibility by making demonstrators and social learn-
ers two distinct roles.
Second, if experimental subjects engage in repeated bouts of social learning, with subjects
repeatedly choosing and observing each other’s choices, estimates of social influence are biased
because of the “reflection problem” [45, 46]. The reflection problem is analogous to inferring
causality when a researcher looks at herself in the mirror and waves. Given the evidence, she
cannot say if her hand is moving her reflection or if her reflection is moving her hand. Simi-
larly, if a subject repeatedly makes observable choices in a group of people who are also making
observable choices, the researcher cannot readily isolate the causal effect of social information
on the choices of a focal subject. The researcher can posit that decision making has a specific
temporal structure, but this can require strong and potentially groundless assumptions. An
experimental design that avoids reflection altogether may thus be preferable. We ensured that
reflection was not possible by allowing demonstrators to engage in multiple bouts of individual
learning, followed by a single bout of social learning among social learners. In effect, demon-
strators produced social information, and social learners consumed it. Participants did not
change roles. Subjects made decisions in 20 independent blocks of five trials per block.
To illustrate procedures in a concrete way, assume that red was the winning color for dem-
onstrators. At the beginning of a block of five trials, the two sets of balls were randomly
assigned to the urns for all subjects in a group, both demonstrators and social learners. The
urn with three red balls was optimal for demonstrators in the sense that the expected payoff
from choosing this urn was 75 points. Demonstrators chose repeatedly and could learn which
urn was optimal for them by seeing the color of the ball drawn after each choice. Demonstra-
tors had no other information, and thus learning was strictly individual.
The social learners in a group faced the same two urns as the demonstrators. Each social
learner, however, only made a single choice per block. After all demonstrators had chosen an
urn in the fifth trial of a block, the distribution of urn choices among the demonstrators, for
the fifth trial only, was communicated to the social learners. Each social learner then chose an
urn. Five balls were randomly drawn with replacement from the chosen urn to determine pay-
offs. We made five draws per choice for each social learner so that both demonstrators and
social learners would receive the same number of realized payoffs. Social learners did not
receive information about their realized payoffs at the end of each block. Instead, they only
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received aggregated feedback at the end of the session, and for this reason they could not learn
how to best use social information as the session progressed.
We implemented four treatments that varied in terms of the relationship between demon-
strators and social learners. In discordant blocks, demonstrators and social learners received
points for balls of different colors. Concordant blocks were the opposite; demonstrators and
social learners both received 100 points for the same color of ball. The discordant-concordant
distinction was implemented within social learners in some sessions. This means that each
social learner participated in 10 discordant blocks and 10 concordant blocks in an alternating
fashion. To avoid anchoring effects, we counterbalanced the initial block across the two groups
of participants within sessions. Implementing both discordant and concordant blocks within
subjects should have made the difference relatively salient. We implicitly invited social learners
to consider the difference and recognize, if they cared to, that they might want to change their
use of social information from one block to the next.
In other sessions, the discordant-concordant distinction was implemented between social
learners. Accordingly, each social learner participated in either 20 discordant blocks or 20 con-
cordant blocks. To avoid session effects, we always had one group of discordant participants in
a session and another group of concordant participants. In these between-subjects treatments,
the discordant-concordant distinction was not salient. Indeed, social learners in a discordant
group were not informed about the presence of concordant groups and vice versa. Social learn-
ers were not implicitly invited to consider different ways of using social information by explic-
itly exposing them to both discordant and concordant treatments. The design of experiment 1
is two-by-two. The similarity between demonstrators and social learners was either discordant
or concordant, and this treatment variation was implemented either within social learners or
between social learners. In all four cases, social learners were told whether they were in a dis-
cordant or concordant block, and so we call these treatments “transparent.”
Importantly, the ex ante probability that a social learner and her demonstrators had the
same optimum was 0.5, and thus the covariance in optima was zero. In addition, the signal was
correct with probability one. This does not mean, however, that we necessarily expect social
learning strategies consistent with these values. Our model does not allow learners to evaluate
current values of γ and ϕ. Rather, learners have inherited values of g^ and ^ that evolved under
past values of γ and ϕ. This is a fundamental point about the extent to which we expect social
learning strategies to reflect past regularities, and we discuss it at length in the general
discussion.
To avoid uninteresting experimental artifacts related to spatial biases or color preferences,
we counterbalanced the color of ball producing 100 points for demonstrators across sessions.
In addition, when choosing an urn, subjects clicked a button labeled “left” or “right.” These
buttons were not oriented left to right, but rather top to bottom. The urn listed on top was ran-
domly determined for each subject and each trial.
We conducted seven sessions using z-Tree [47] under anonymous laboratory conditions at
the University of Lausanne. Our data include observations from 70 demonstrators and 76
social learners. Each participant received a show-up fee of 10 Swiss Francs, and the average
total payment was 41.38 Swiss Francs. Before participating, participants provided informed
consent by signing a consent form. The consent procedure and methods for the entire study
were approved by the Human Subjects Committee of the Faculty of Business and Economics
at the University of Lausanne and by the Human Subjects Committee of the Faculty of Eco-
nomics, Business Administration, and Information Technology at the University of Zurich.
Select screen shots from the z-Tree program are presented in S3 Appendix, translated instruc-
tions are available as S1 Instructions, and raw data are available as S1 Data.
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Results
Demonstrators identified their own optimal urns effectively. Demonstrators chose their
optima in the final periods of blocks at a rate well above chance (logistic regression, robust
standard errors clustered on demonstrator, p 0.001). Of the five demonstrators in a group, a
majority chose the demonstrator optimum in the final period of a block in 90.7% of all blocks.
Four out of five choosing optimally was the modal outcome. This result means that, in the
final period of discordant blocks, the minority choice among demonstrators was typically the
optimal choice for social learners. In concordant blocks, the majority choice was typically the
optimal choice for social learners.
Fig 3 shows the average social learning functions by treatment. Social learners exhibited a
strong tendency to follow the minority choice among demonstrators in discordant blocks and
the majority choice in concordant blocks. Table 1 shows results from associated logistic regres-
sions. The key finding is that the response to social information was strongly facultative. For
discordant blocks, social learners showed a highly significant decrease in the rate of choosing
left as the number of left choices among demonstrators increased (Table 1, “Prop left, cen-
tered”). In concordant blocks, the result was the opposite, with social learners showing a highly
significant increase in choosing left in tandem with demonstrators (Table 1, “Prop left, cen-
tered”). In all cases, social learning functions are close to the boundaries at zero and one, with
a sharp discontinuity between two and three demonstrators choosing left, and this indicates
limited heterogeneity among social learners (Fig 3)
As discussed earlier, our model shows that social cognition often evolves to produce asym-
metric facultative adjustments. To test for asymmetry, we analyzed the rate at which social
learners chose the social learner optimum as a function of whether a majority of demonstrators
chose the demonstrator optimum (Table 2). The results reveal no trace of an asymmetry. In dis-
cordant blocks, when demonstrators moved from a minority to a majority choosing the demon-
strator optimum, the result was a highly significant increase in the rate at which social learners
chose the social learner optimum (Table 2, “Majority demo opt”). In concordant blocks, when
demonstrators moved from a minority to a majority choosing the demonstrator optimum, the
result was also a highly significant increase in the rate at which social learners chose the social
learner optimum (linear combinations, “Majority demo opt + Concordant × Majority demo
opt”; Within-subjects, F = 28.74, p 0.001; Between-subjects, F = 28.77, p 0.001). Concor-
dance had no impact, neither in terms of main effects (Table 2, “Concordant”), in interactions
(Table 2, “Concordant × Majority demo opt”), nor as linear combinations of the two (“Concor-
dant + Concordant × Majority demo opt”; Within-subjects, F = 0.362, p = 0.548; Between-sub-
jects, F = 0.958, p = 0.328). These results show that the facultative shift in social learning was
complete. The key question was whether demonstrators chose their own optimum and not
whether learners had the same optimum as demonstrators. When demonstrators did well, social
learners also did well, and this was equivalently true regardless of whether demonstrators and
social learners had different optima or the same optimum. Simply put, social learners showed
no trace of an asymmetric response to social information based on similarity (Fig 2).
Discussion
Results from experiment 1 show that our subjects used a completely flexible approach to social
learning. Facultative adjustments were complete, and subjects eliminated the stark trade-off,
ubiquitous in theoretical studies on the evolution of conformity, between discordance and
concordance. They also eliminated the weaker trade-off that would have occurred had they
adjusted their use of social information in an asymmetric fashion. Importantly, social cogni-
tion in our model can evolve to produce symmetric facultative adjustments like those we
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observed. This requires the covariance in optima to be sufficiently weak and the signal of simi-
larity to be sufficiently reliable. In our experiment, the covariance was indeed zero, and the sig-
nal was perfectly reliable. Our model, however, does not allow learners to evaluate covariance
and signal reliability on a case-by-case basis. Covariance and signal reliability are instead
Fig 3. Left choices by social learners in the four transparent treatments from experiment 1. The points show the rate at which social
learners chose left as a function of the number of demonstrators choosing left in the final trials of blocks. The number of observations is
vertically aligned with each point. Panels A and C show the discordant treatments, while panels B and D show the concordant treatments.
Panels A and B show the within-subjects treatments, while panels C and D show the between-subjects treatments. Error bars are 95%
bootstrapped confidence intervals clustered on social learner. Clustering accounts for correlations due to multiple observations per social
learner [48], and bootstrapping ensures that confidence intervals remain in [0, 1]. The gray region of the space is consistent with conformist
cultural transmission [1, 11]. The diagonal in black is consistent with unbiased social learning, which does not generate cultural evolution,
and dashed lines provide additional points of reference at 0, 0.5, and 1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0168551.g003
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inherited representations of the decision-making task. Thus, the symmetric adjustments we
observed suggest at least two possibilities.
The first possibility is that weak covariance and reliable signals were characteristic of the
evolutionary past, and in our experiment we measured the evolved social learning strategies
Table 1. Social learners choosing left in discordant and concordant treatments from experiment 1.
Results are from logistic regressions. Independent variables include an index for the 20 learning blocks in
each session and the distribution of choices among demonstrators in the fifth trial of the block. This distribution
is centered at zero. Thus, if p5 is the proportion of demonstrators choosing left in the fifth trial, we transform
this as x5 = p5 − 0.5. Robust standard errors clustered on social learner account for any correlations due to
multiple observations per social learner [48, 49], and we show these robust clustered standard errors in
parentheses.
Parameter Within-subjects Between-subjects
Discordant
Intercept -0.849
(0.444)
0.707**
(0.259)
Learning block 0.048
(0.026)
-0.029
(0.027)
Prop left, centered -7.446***
(1.432)
-9.163**
(2.952)
Concordant
Intercept 0.358
(0.229)
0.156
(0.232)
Learning block -0.040
(0.023)
0.018
(0.021)
Prop left, centered 8.335***
(1.363)
5.867***
(1.495)
*** (0.001)
** (0.01)
* (0.05)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0168551.t001
Table 2. Social learning and optimal choices from experiment 1. Results are from logistic regressions that model social learners choosing the social
learner optimum. Independent variables include an index for the 20 learning blocks in each session, a dummy specifying if left was the optimal urn for social
learners, a dummy indicating concordance between demonstrators and social learners, a dummy indicating if a majority of demonstrators chose the demon-
strator optimum, and the interaction between these last two dummies. Robust standard errors clustered on social learner account for any correlations due to
multiple observations per social learner [48, 49], and we show these robust clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Parameter Within-subjects Between-subjects
Intercept -1.946***
(0.570)
-2.780***
(0.737)
Trial block 0.033
(0.023)
0.042
(0.029)
Left optimal (soc) -0.061
(0.287)
0.751
(0.404)
Concordant -0.279
(0.531)
-0.143
(0.800)
Majority demo opt 3.897***
(0.673)
4.573***
(0.929)
Concordant × Majority demo opt 0.141
(0.630)
-0.528
(1.200)
*** (0.001)
** (0.01)
* (0.05)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0168551.t002
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associated with these past regularities. Importantly, weak covariance and reliable signals may
have held in some domains in the past. Consider a sexual division of labor such that women
and men had separate roles in society and different optima. A demonstrator was just as likely
to be a woman as a man, the covariance in optima would have been approximately zero, and a
person’s gender was probably an extremely reliable signal of similarity. Across many domains,
however, one can easily imagine that mechanisms like temporal and spatial heterogeneity
would have generated positive covariance in optima and moderately informative signals. If so,
conditions would have been conducive to the evolution of asymmetric rather than symmetric
facultative adjustments. The question then becomes, to what extent are social learning strate-
gies domain-specific? This would be an important topic for future empirical research.
The second possibility is that social learners in our experiment, regardless of the evolution-
ary past, recognized that learner and demonstrator optima did not covary, signals of similarity
were extremely reliable, and symmetric adjustments were thus the best way to make money.
This possibility is compelling because the structure of our experimental paradigm was indeed
transparent, and so perhaps subjects did not need to rely on evolved social learning strategies.
Perhaps all they needed was an intuitive understanding of probability theory and enough men-
talizing ability to anticipate that demonstrators would try to identify, with considerable suc-
cess, the demonstrator optimum. By this reasoning, our experimental results represent the
outcome of highly general processes that can interpret frequency-dependent social informa-
tion but are in no way limited to processing this kind of information.
One might argue that the gene-culture coevolution of cultural transmission, in contrast,
specifically concerns heuristics that people apply when the decision-making task is not
completely transparent. In such situations, people might turn to evolved social learning strate-
gies as rules of thumb [2, 50] for extracting useful information from the social group. If so,
when people are in situations where they do not know what to do but they have access to social
information, their choices should reveal intrinsic preferences for specific social learning strate-
gies like following the majority. People may be able to override such preferences if they under-
stand that doing so is in their own material interest, as in our transparent discordant
treatments. Otherwise, evolved preferences should reveal themselves. Furthermore, if people
use evolved social learning strategies when they cannot tell what to do, these strategies should
somehow reflect default assumptions derived from the structure of decision-making at the
time the strategy evolved. If concordance, for example, was the typical scenario in the past,
social cognition could have evolved, genetically or even culturally [27], to assume concordance
in the absence of contradictory information. Again, people may be able to override this default
if they have clear information showing that learners and demonstrators are dissimilar, as in
our discordant treatments. Otherwise, default assumptions should reveal themselves. To test
this reasoning, we conducted a second experiment that examined both preferences for specific
social learning strategies and default assumptions about the similarity between social learners
and demonstrators.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 was similar to the first experiment, with one key exception. We did not inform
social learners about their similarity to demonstrators. In some treatments, we withheld this
information in a way that maximized the potential for social learners to express specific social
learning strategies they might have preferred. In effect, we eliminated any possibility of a con-
flict between one’s preferred strategy and one’s preference for making money, and so social
learners had no reason to do anything but rely on their preferred social learning strategies. In
other treatments, we withheld information about similarity in a way that forced social learners
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to rely on default assumptions about the similarity between social learners and demonstrators.
If social cognition, in the absence of contradictory evidence, assumes either discordance or
concordance, social learners should have revealed the assumption in these treatments.
Materials and methods
Each group contained five demonstrators and from five to 11 social learners. The experiment
was two-by-two. The first dimension of the experimental design was the same as in experiment
1. Namely, blocks were either discordant or concordant. Unlike experiment 1, however, we
did not inform social learners which type of block they faced. Social learners knew the relation
with demonstrators in a given block was either discordant or concordant, but they did not
know which. For this reason we call these treatments “opaque.” We always implemented the
discordant-concordant distinction within social learners with the order counterbalanced
across groups within a session.
In the second dimension of the experimental design, we varied whether we told social learn-
ers about the prior probabilities of discordant and concordant blocks. In the prior treatment,
we revealed to social learners that any given block would be either discordant or concordant
with equal probability. This feature, combined with the uniform probabilities for assigning
balls to urns, ensured that social learners had the information necessary to determine that all
social learning strategies were equivalent in terms of expected payoffs. Indeed, they had the
information necessary to determine that social learning strategies could not affect the ex ante
distribution of payoffs in any way (S4 Appendix). Consequently, if a social learner had some
preference for a specific social learning strategy, she could have expressed this preference with-
out concern for the material consequences, and in a open-response survey after the experiment
a clear majority of social learners voluntarily expressed an understanding of this (S4 Appen-
dix). Regardless of whether the social learner had preferences over expected payoffs, the vari-
ance in payoffs, skew, or kurtosis, all social learning strategies were equivalent in expectation.
Because all social learning strategies were equivalent, opaque treatments with known priors
removed all countervailing forces that could have prevented a social learner from expressing
her preferred social learning strategy.
In the no prior treatment, we did not reveal the prior probabilities associated with discor-
dant or concordant blocks, and thus social learners did not have the information necessary to
determine that all social learning strategies were ex ante equivalent. Simply by excluding infor-
mation about the prior, we forced social learners to rely on default assumptions about the simi-
larity between social learners and demonstrators. If social learners tended to assume a uniform
prior, the no prior treatment should have been identical to the opaque treatment with the
prior. If, however, social learning strategies evolved under conditions in which learners and
demonstrators typically had the same optimum, social cognition might revert to this past regu-
larity in the absence of evidence indicating otherwise. If so, the opaque treatment with no
prior should have been similar to concordant blocks in experiment 1. Altogether, we con-
ducted six sessions with 55 demonstrators and 87 social learners. Participants received a show-
up fee of 10 Swiss Francs, and the average total payment was 36.66 Swiss Francs.
Results
Demonstrators again identified their own optimal urns effectively. Demonstrators chose their
own optima in the final periods of blocks at a rate highly significantly above chance (logistic
regression, robust standard errors clustered on demonstrator, p 0.001). Of the five demon-
strators in a group, a majority chose the demonstrator optimum in the final period of a block
in 95.5% of all blocks. Four out of five choosing optimally was the modal outcome.
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For the analyses of social learner choices, we sometimes pool over discordant and concor-
dant blocks (Table 3 and Figs 4 and 5). This approach reflects the fact that social learners could
not distinguish between these blocks during the experiment. For other analyses, we condition
on whether a block was discordant or concordant (Table 4). Social learners did not have this
information, but our fully informed ex post perspective allows us to analyze the data in this
way. Doing so, in particular, provides an effective approach to identifying any trade-offs cre-
ated by a systematic response to social information. For example, following the minority and
following the majority were equivalent ex ante. Ex post, however, following the minority
would have typically produced large payoffs in discordant but not concordant blocks, while
following the majority would have typically produced large payoffs in concordant but not dis-
cordant blocks. We test for trade-offs by conditioning on discordance versus concordance in
exactly this way (Table 4).
In the prior treatments, the 95% bootstrapped confidence interval clustered on social
learner includes 0.5 for any distribution of choices among demonstrators (Fig 4). In this sense,
choices were random on average. However, the graph suggests a weakly positive response to
social information, and regression results confirm a relatively weak but significantly positive
response of this sort (Table 3, Prior, “Prop left, centered”). In treatments with no prior infor-
mation, aggregate social learning strategies show that the overall response to social informa-
tion was unsystematic (Fig 4), and regressions lead to the same conclusion. Social learner
choices were not significantly related to demonstrator choices (Table 3, No prior, “Prop left,
centered”). Importantly, however, an analysis of both the prior and no prior treatments
together reveals that social learning strategies did not differ significantly across these two sets
of treatments (Table 3, Combined).
With respect to trade-offs, the positive social influence observed in the prior treatments sig-
nificantly reduced optimal choices among social learners in discordant blocks. Specifically, in
discordant blocks the shift from a minority to a majority of demonstrators choosing the dem-
onstrator optimum significantly reduced the rate at which social learners chose the social
Table 3. Social learners choosing left in experiment 2. Results are from logistic regressions for the prior and no prior treatments. Data are pooled over dis-
cordant and concordant blocks. Independent variables include an index for the 20 learning blocks in each session and the distribution of choices among dem-
onstrators in the fifth trial of the block. This distribution is centered at zero. Thus, if p5 is the proportion of demonstrators choosing left in the fifth trial, we
transform this as x5 = p5 − 0.5. Robust standard errors clustered on social learner account for any correlations due to multiple observations per social learner
[48, 49], and we show these robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. The final column combines the analysis of the prior and no prior treatments and
shows no significant difference between them. In particular, the estimated rates of choosing left are not significantly different at the extreme values of x5. Spe-
cifically, for the linear combination, “No prior + 0.5 (No prior × Prop left, centered)”, F = 2.7684 and p = 0.096. For “No prior − 0.5 (No prior × Prop left, cen-
tered)”, F = 0.005 and p = 0.943.
Parameter Prior No prior Combined
Intercept 0.241
(0.191)
-0.076
(0.160)
0.228
(0.175)
Learning block -0.017
(0.011)
-0.014
(0.012)
-0.0153
(0.008)
Prop left, centered 0.975*
(0.476)
0.345
(0.324)
0.975*
(0.473)
No prior -0.291
(0.193)
No prior × Prop left, centered -0.629
(0.572)
*** (0.001)
** (0.01)
* (0.05)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0168551.t003
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learner optimum (Table 4, Prior, “Majority demo opt”). In concordant blocks, however, this
same shift did not significantly affect the rate at which social learners chose the social learner
optimum (Table 4, Prior, linear combination, “Majority demo opt + Concordant × Majority
demo opt”, F = 0.498, p = 0.481). Moreover, social learners in concordant blocks did not
choose their optimum significantly more than social learners in discordant blocks, regardless
of whether a minority of demonstrators chose the demonstrator optimum (Table 4,
Prior, “Concordant”) or a majority (Table 4, Prior, linear combination, “Concordant
+ Concordant × Majority demo opt”, F = 3.460, p = 0.0632). All in all, these results show some
trade-offs, though limited, in prior treatments. Specifically, for social learners in discordant
blocks, the effectiveness of individual learning among demonstrators was a significant distinc-
tion. We found no other evidence for trade-offs, however, which is consistent with the obser-
vation that the positive social influence observed was relatively weak (Fig 4).
In treatments without the prior, we found no evidence for trade-offs of any kind. The dis-
tinction between a minority and a majority of demonstrators choosing the demonstrator opti-
mum had no significant effect on optimal choices among social learners. This result holds
when considering the main effect (Table 4, No prior, “Majority demo opt”), the interaction
(Table 4, No prior, “Concordant × Majority demo opt”), and the linear combination (Table 4,
No prior, linear combination, “Majority demo opt + Concordant × Majority demo opt”,
F = 2.673, p = 0.102). The distinction between discordant and concordant blocks also had no
significant effect, neither when a minority of demonstrators chose the demonstrator optimum
(Table 4, No prior, “Concordant”) nor when a majority of demonstrators chose the
Fig 4. Left choices by social learners in opaque treatments from experiment 2. The points show the rate at which social learners chose
left as a function of the number of demonstrators choosing left in the final trials of blocks. The relevant number of observations is vertically
aligned with each point. Panel A pools over discordant and concordant blocks when social learners knew the prior probabilities associated
with discordance versus concordance. Panel B shows pooled data when social learners did not know these priors. Error bars are 95%
bootstrapped confidence intervals clustered on social learner. Clustering accounts for correlations due to multiple observations per social
learner [48], and bootstrapping ensures that confidence intervals remain in [0, 1]. The gray region of the space is consistent with conformist
cultural transmission [1, 11]. The diagonal in black is consistent with unbiased social learning, which does not generate cultural evolution,
and dashed lines provide additional points of reference at 0, 0.5, and 1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0168551.g004
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Fig 5. Disaggregated social learnings strategies in opaque treatments from experiment 2. We placed each social learner in one of
four categories. A social learner who always followed the minority choice among demonstrators was a “Min” type. One who always followed
the majority was a “Maj” type. One who always chose left or always chose right was a “U” type (Unconditional). For the social learners
who did not fall into these three categories, we estimated the social learning function of each. Specifically, let Yjk 2 {0, 1} indicate if social
learner k chose left in block j, and let xj be the centered proportion of demonstrators choosing left. We estimated b^k by fitting P(Yjk = 1) =(exp{βk xj})/(1 + exp{βk xj}) via maximum likelihood. Panels A and B show the distributions over types for the two opaque treatments with
data pooled over discordant and concordant blocks. Gray bars show b^k estimates significant at the 5% level. Given multiple tests, we expect
two to three significant values by chance in each panel. Social learners who followed the minority (Min) or majority (Maj) and social learners
with extreme values of b^k (e.g. jb^k j > 10) clearly responded to social information. The rest did not.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0168551.g005
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demonstrator optimum (Table 4, No prior, linear combination, “Concordant + Concordant
× Majority demo opt”, F = 1.560, p = 0.212).
The response to social information and associated trade-offs in the prior treatments
occurred because a few social learners conformed. To see this, we characterized the social
learning strategy of each social learner. We found that the vast majority exhibited no system-
atic response to social information (Fig 5). 10 of the 43 social learners in the prior treatment,
however, responded strongly to social information. Eight of these did so by always following
the majority choice among demonstrators, and two exhibited a strong tendency to follow the
minority (Fig 5). This imbalance is responsible for the relatively weak but significantly positive
response to social information at the aggregate level, a response that also tied the performance
of social learners to the performance of demonstrators when social learners were unknowingly
in discordant blocks.
In the treatments with no prior, an analysis of the strategy used by each social learner fur-
ther demonstrates the lack of systematic social learning in these treatments. The vast majority
of social learners did not respond to social information (Fig 5). Only four of the 44 social learn-
ers responded strongly to social information. Three always followed the majority, and one
always followed the minority (Fig 5).
Discussion
Results from the prior treatments show a tendency to follow the majority among a subset of
social learners. These conformists were not especially common, constituting a bit less than a
fifth of social learners, but they did consistently follow the majority. Nearly all of the remaining
social learners did not respond to social information. Consequently, without a meaningful sub-
set of social learners to offset the conformists, social influence was significantly positive at the
aggregate level.
Table 4. Social learning and optimal choices from experiment 2. Results are from logistic regressions
that model social learners choosing the social learner optimum. Independent variables include an index for the
20 learning blocks in each session, a dummy specifying if left was the optimal urn for social learners, a dummy
indicating concordance between demonstrators and social learners, a dummy indicating if a majority of dem-
onstrators chose the demonstrator optimum, and the interaction between these last two dummies. Robust
standard errors clustered on social learner account for any correlations due to multiple observations per social
learner [48, 49], and we show these robust clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Parameter Prior No prior
Intercept 0.745
(0.468)
0.297
(0.453)
Trial block 0.006
(0.012)
0.003
(0.012)
Left optimal (soc) 0.114
(0.307)
-0.413
(0.228)
Concordant -1.007
(0.762)
-1.403
(0.780)
Majority demo opt -1.192*
(0.517)
-0.276
(0.521)
Concordant × Majority demo opt 1.623
(0.956)
1.702
(0.919)
*** (0.001)
** (0.01)
* (0.05)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0168551.t004
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The treatments without priors, in contrast, showed no evidence for strategies that
responded systematically to social information. In effect, social learners ignored demonstra-
tors, and they did so even though the distribution of demonstrator choices was the only infor-
mation they had. This finding suggests that social learners were not willing to make
assumptions about their similarity to demonstrators. In particular, in contrast to what we
would expect if concordance was typical in the past and continues to shape social learning in
the present, they revealed no tendency to assume concordance or to rely on some measure of
conformity as a default strategy.
Crucially, however, even though social influence was consistently positive in the prior treat-
ments but not in the no prior treatments, the prior and no prior cases were not significantly
different from each other. This suggests that social learners treated the two cases similarly.
More to the point, social learners in no prior treatments had no information of any kind about
their similarity to demonstrators. They treated this, as suggested by many social learners in an
open-response survey after the experiment (S4 Appendix), like a situation in which social
learners knew that their optimum and the demonstrator optimum were just as likely to be the
same as different. By extension, if behavior in the no prior treatments reflected the degree of
similarity in the evolutionary past, genetic or cultural, our result indicates that learner and
demonstrator optima were uncorrelated with each other at that time. Another possibility, how-
ever, is that social cognition is more complex than this because it allows a more flexible assess-
ment of similarity. For example, in addition to evaluating their similarity to demonstrators,
social learners may also be able to evaluate the quality of the information they have about simi-
larity, all as part of a relatively complex and flexible assessment of how to best use frequency-
dependent social information. In an experiment with no prior, for example, a uniform prior is
arguably a reasonable assumption, whatever the typical covariance between learner and dem-
onstrator optima in the evolutionary past.
General discussion
What do these findings tell us about the complexity of evolved social cognition and the associ-
ated scope for people to modulate their use of frequency-dependent social information accord-
ing to circumstance? To clarify the issues at hand, we simplify by putting aside individual
learning and focusing exclusively on facultative social learning strategies. Switching faculta-
tively between individual and social learning can also be important [43, 51], but we single out
questions about adjustments to the use of social information conditional on social information
being used.
Consider first a non-facultative social learner. A non-facultative social learner observes the
distribution of choices among demonstrators and chooses based on this observation. We will
call this a “first-order” strategy because the social learner can respond to variation in demon-
strator choices, but she cannot do more. Although most theory on the evolution of frequency-
dependent social learning assumes this level of complexity, our results join other recent studies
[27, 28] indicating that social learning strategies are more complex than this. The reason is the
following. If a social learner can only respond to variation in the distribution of choices, she
cannot change how she responds to any specific distribution given the value of some other var-
iable. Social learners, however, actually can do this [27, 28, 52]. We added this kind of com-
plexity in our model by allowing learners to process information about their similarity to the
demonstrators from whom they learn. Under appropriate conditions, facultative learning
strategies evolve. We will call such strategies “second-order” because a social learner can
respond to both information about similarity and variation in the distribution of choices
among demonstrators. This is the maximum level of complexity our model supports.
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Importantly, however, social learning strategies could be still more complex. For example,
aside from responding to both perceived similarity and distributional information, social
learners may also be able to evaluate the quality of the information they have about their simi-
larity to demonstrators. This idea would be broadly consistent with our data. To illustrate the
logic, social learners in transparent treatments knew they had high quality information about
similarity, which led to symmetric switching between following the minority and following the
majority. If conditions in the past supported the evolution of asymmetric switching, social
learning was nonetheless flexible enough to leave this past regularity aside. Analogously, in
opaque treatments, social learners knew they had little or no relevant information about simi-
larity (S4 Appendix), which led most of them to simply ignore demonstrators instead of rely-
ing on an inherited preference for conformity or the assumption of concordance. Although
our data do not allow us to definitively conclude that this was the relevant cognitive mix, we
would like to point out that strategies of this kind would be at least “third-order.”
In any case, our results and others show that facultative responses to frequency-dependent
social information can easily outstrip the complexity widely assumed in theoretical work [27,
28]. This finding raises a number of key questions. One key question centers on whether peo-
ple generally make facultative adjustments based on perceived similarity? Theory shows that
arbitrary symbols can evolve to serve as reliable signals of similarity. In particular, initially
meaningless symbols can evolve culturally to reflect otherwise unobservable similarities and
differences that affect the value of social information [41]. Consequently, reliable markers of
similarity are theoretically feasible. Moreover, evaluating similarity seems to be crucial to the
development of human social cognition [53], but evaluations are not simply blunt assessments
by which a social learner decides whom to imitate and whom to ignore. Rather, infants as
young as 18 months have a sophisticated understanding of similarity that allows them to dis-
criminate between observed behaviors that should be imitated, observed behaviors that are
superfluous, and observed behaviors that should be avoided [54, 55].
More broadly, young infants demonstrate remarkable sophistication in terms of their ability
to infer the preferences and epistemic states of others and to interpret observed behaviors
accordingly [56, 57]. This suggests that from a young age social cognition is already equipped
to interpret the behavior of others based on situational contingencies. Moreover, a recent
fMRI study found that subjects used the opinions of dissimilar others as examples of how not
to think [52], a response broadly analogous to following the minority in our transparent dis-
cordant treatments. Finally, recent studies of cultural transmission show that people condition
their response to social information on circumstance [28, 29, 40, 58, 59], and thus evidence
indicates that social learning strategies are often facultative. The number of possible adjust-
ments people can make is potentially huge, and many open questions remain [27].
A second key question centers on the consequences of facultative adjustments. In general,
facultative adjustments to the use of social information can have at least two related, funda-
mental effects. They can alter the cultural evolutionary dynamics that occur, and they can tem-
per the trade-offs between the costs and benefits that would obtain if a non-facultative strategy
was applied. Both of these effects will modify natural selection on the social cognition that
underpins social learning and cultural transmission. As a result, facultative strategies have the
potential to dramatically affect the gene-culture coevolution of human social cognition.
To illustrate, consider the extent to which a conformist bias is like an inflexible heuristic.
We can imagine a spectrum of flexibility. At the extreme heuristic end of the spectrum, confor-
mity is like a genetically inherited rigid algorithm with little scope for developmental plasticity.
The algorithm takes information about the distribution of behaviors among demonstrators
and outputs a behavior without subtlety or consideration of momentary eventualities. Such an
algorithm is effective when learners and demonstrators have the same optimum, but it imposes
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a tremendous drag on optimal choices when learners and demonstrators have different
optima. Mesoudi and colleagues [27] describe social learning strategies of this sort as poten-
tially variable across individuals, but fixed at birth for any given individual.
Moving away from rigid first-order algorithms, a social learner may opt for one response to
social information or another because of specific triggers during development [27]. Our model
is closest to this formulation, but as suggested above the resulting flexibility may still be inade-
quate in many cases. Moving further along the spectrum, we can imagine that individuals
acquire social learning strategies during development via individual or social learning [27].
Interestingly, though this probably occurs for some species [27], such a mechanism cannot
explain our data. The social learners in our experiment only received feedback about their per-
formance at the end of experimental sessions, and they never had any information about how
other social learners were using social information. Thus, they were never in a position to
learn how to learn socially.
Finally, as the most flexible approach to social learning, social learning strategies can arise
endogenously from Bayesian inference given a rich set of priors, conditional probabilities, and
data. In this case, social learning is at its most flexible precisely because it is not constrained by
the structure of the decision-making task in the genetic evolutionary past, the cultural evolu-
tionary past, or even the developmental past. For example, even if a Bayesian’s genetic and cul-
tural ancestors typically faced positive covariance between the optima of learners and
demonstrators, and even if the Bayesian herself typically faced positive covariance during her
own development, these past regularities need not intrude upon the current strategy of the
Bayesian. If the Bayesian knows the current prior probability that she shares an optimum with
demonstrators, and if she knows the conditional probabilities necessary to process information
about a shared optimum, she can calculate the correct posterior without regard for her genetic,
cultural, or developmental heritage. Instead of the past somehow constraining the present, a
completely general process integrates all relevant information. Social learning strategies do not
exist as independent forms of cognition in this case. They emerge as perfectly flexible
responses that follow from ordinary Bayesian inference and the structure of the decision-mak-
ing task. Evolved and learned strategies can perhaps approximate this kind of flexibility, but
they will need to be high-order strategies to do so.
Importantly, evidence suggests that neither rigid heuristics nor Bayesian inferences are
likely to typify human social learning. On the one hand, social learning strategies vary from
one situation to another [27], and so we know that extreme rigidity is unlikely to hold in many
cases. On the other hand, humans sometimes adopt the most common behavior when doing
so is obviously sub-optimal [8], and they sometimes conform little when doing so would be
optimal [10]. Bayesian maximizers would never make these mistakes. Moreover, in experi-
ments with a combination of individual learning and frequency-dependent social learning,
observed dynamics at the aggregate level are about as far as possible from the rational predic-
tion provided by the Bayesian Nash benchmark [60]. This further suggests that strict Bayesian
inference is unlikely to be a good description of social cognition. Surprisingly, however, one
only has to allow minor deviations from optimal decisions based on Bayesian inference, and
theoretical predictions at the aggregate level suddenly match experimental data extremely well
[60]. Consequently, if maximizing expected payoffs under Bayesian beliefs does not lead to
accurate behavioral predictions, something very close to this benchmark might.
The wrinkle is the following. Even if frequency-dependent social learning is neither a rigid
heuristic nor the result of Bayesians maximizing expected payoffs, it can still be closer toward
one end of the spectrum or the other. Insofar as social learning strategies like conformity are
rigidly applied, they maximize the evolutionary trade-off between the instances when they
exploit social information effectively and the instances when they do not. Insofar as social
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learning strategies are adaptively facultative or effectively learned as the individual develops,
strategies can approach the Bayesian ideal, and trade-offs should be less important. Our place
between the two extremes is both the result of and the mechanism that shapes the gene-culture
coevolution of human social cognition.
A final key question centers on the link between facultative adjustments to the use of social
information and the number of behavioral options. In our experiment, as in much of the the-
ory on the evolution of conformity, two behavioral options existed. As a result, following the
minority in discordant scenarios was just as good as following the majority in concordant
scenarios.
This possibility, however, is unique to situations with two options. If three options exist,
eliminating trade-offs is not so easy. Even if social learners know they have a different opti-
mum than demonstrators, this still leaves two options on the table. If social learners know they
have the same optimum, however, this focuses attention on a single option. A signal indicating
discordance is useful information, but it is less useful than a signal indicating concordance.
This discrepancy only becomes larger as the number of possible behaviors increases. Conse-
quently, facultatively switching between individual learning and social learning may become
more important, and social learning strategies, when used, may be less flexible. Indeed, recent
experimental evidence shows that people rely on conformity more as the number of behavioral
options increases [28].
Ultimately, evolved social cognition seems capable of managing, at least to some extent,
both facultative switching between individual and social learning and facultative adjustments
to how learners respond to social information. The former is a common theme in gene-culture
coevolution [26, 34, 43, 51], while the latter is not. Future research should consider how both
types of flexibility can influence the evolution of human social cognition and associated cul-
tural evolutionary dynamics.
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